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This paper estimates the eﬀect of Wal-Mart expansion on retail employment
at the county level. Using an instrumental-variables approach to correct for
both measurement error in entry dates and endogeneity of the timing of
entry, I ﬁnd that Wal-Mart entry increases retail employment by 100 jobs
i nt h ey e a ro fe n t r y .H a l fo ft h i sg a i nd i s a p p e a r so v e rt h en e x tﬁve years as
other retail establishments exit and contract, leaving a long-run statistically
signiﬁcant net gain of 50 jobs. Wholesale employment declines by approxi-
mately 20 jobs due to Wal-Mart’s vertical integration. No spillover eﬀect is
detected in retail sectors in which Wal-Mart does not compete directly, sug-
gesting Wal-Mart does not create agglomeration economies in retail trade at
the county level.
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Wal-Mart corporation employs nearly one million workers in the United States — more
than any other private company — and over 300,000 additional workers worldwide. It
is rumored to have plans to hire as many as 800,000 additional workers in the next ﬁve
years. USA Today quotes a retail-industry consultant as saying that Wal-Mart “created
more jobs in the 1990s than any other company” (Hopkins 2003). Has Wal-Mart created
more jobs than it destroyed?
Given the level of public interest in Wal-Mart and other “big box” retailers, there
has been surprising little independent research on their impact on local labor markets.1
Research into this question is hampered by paucity of data on Wal-Mart and the other
large retail chains and by concerns about endogeneity of the entry decision. Firms
respond to local conditions when they expand or relocate establishments — more so in
the nontradable retail sector than in tradable sectors (like manufacturing) — so it is
diﬃcult to disentangle the direct eﬀect of expansion from the indirect eﬀects of the
conditions that lead to it.2
This paper attempts to quantify the impact of Wal-Mart entry on county-level retail
employment by exploiting exogenous variation in the timing of store entry. I use a
unique data set containing the locations and opening dates of all U.S. Wal-Mart stores
to estimate the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on retail employment in the county, as well as
on employment in other industries and in surrounding counties. To address endogeneity
concerns, my instrumental-variables speciﬁcation exploits the variable lag between store-
planning dates and store-opening dates. Store numbers, assigned by Wal-Mart during
the planning process, are used to proxy for planning dates. Because my data cover a
long time period (1977-1998) and approximately 1,750 counties, I am able to examine
1the dynamics of county-level retail employment over a ten-year period surrounding Wal-
Mart entry, separately estimating short- and long-run eﬀects.
One way Wal-Mart entry could aﬀect labor markets is by increasing average eﬃciency
in the retail sector, so fewer workers are needed per sale. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan
(2002) ﬁnd that nearly all productivity growth in the retail sector in the last decade
can be accounted for by reallocation of workers due to net entry of establishments;
they do not name individual companies in their analysis, but Wal-Mart expansion likely
represents an important force in this reallocation. Diﬀu s i o no fW a l - M a r t ’ se ﬃcient
practices — perhaps due to learning/imitation by competitors — may lead other retailers
to decrease employment more than proportionately to the decrease in their market
share.3
Another possible eﬀect could arise from externalities Wal-Mart creates for other
retailers in the county. If Wal-Mart increases customer traﬃc in the store’s vicinity —
like an anchor store in a traditional mall (see Pashigian and Gould 1998) — the number
and size of other retailers could increase, leading to an increase in retail employment.
At the county level, this eﬀect is likely to be small because of the nontraded nature
of retail services, which operates against concentration in the industry (Holmes and
Stevens (forthcoming)). To test this hypothesis against the alternative that Wal-Mart
merely captures some of the business of existing retailers I estimate the eﬀect of Wal-
Mart entry on the number of retail establishments in diﬀerent size categories and its
eﬀect on retail employment in establishments not directly competing with Wal-Mart.
For the second exercise, I use employment in two sectors, restaurants and automobile
dealerships and service stations.4 If Wal-Mart merely substitutes for other retailers,
t h en u m b e ro fs m a l la n dm e d i u m - s i z e dr e t a i l establishments should decline, and Wal-
2Mart will not have any impact on retailers in sectors where Wal-Mart does not compete
directly. If Wal-Mart entry creates positive externalities for other retailers, the number
of small and medium-sized retail establishments could increase, as could employment
in restaurants and automobile dealerships. I also test for a negative indirect eﬀect of
Wal-Mart entry on retail employment in neighboring counties to see whether Wal-Mart
entry imposes negative externalities on nearby communities.
To see how much of Wal-Mart’s measured eﬀect on retail employment is due to a
change in the classiﬁcation of workers in the county from wholesale to retail, I also
estimate the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on wholesale employment. Finally, a falsiﬁcation
test estimates Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on manufacturing employment.
I ﬁnd that immediately after entry, retail employment in the county increases by
approximately 100 jobs; this ﬁgure declines by half over the next ﬁv ey e a r sa ss o m e
small and medium-sized retail establishments close. Wholesale employment declines by
approximately 20 jobs over ﬁve years. Restaurant employment increases slightly; there
is no change in employment in manufacturing or in automobile dealerships and service
stations. No eﬀect can be detected on retail employment in neighboring counties, due
to very large conﬁdence bands.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on Wal-Mart. Section 3 describes the data. My empirical strategy is ex-
plained in Section 4, and results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
32 Wal-Mart Background
The ﬁrst Wal-Mart store opened in Benton County, Arkansas in 1962. By the time the
company went public in 1969 it had 18 stores throughout Arkansas, Missouri, and Ok-
lahoma. The company slowly expanded its geographical reach, building new stores and
accompanying distribution centers further and further away from its original location,
and continued, at the same time, to build new stores in areas already serviced. Figure 1
shows maps of the 48 contiguous states with approximate locations of Wal-Mart stores
over time to illustrate this point. By 1998 Wal-Mart had approximately 2400 stores in
all 50 states and about 800,000 employees in the United States. The company grows —
as measured by the number of employees and the number of stores it operates — by the
week. The largest retailer in both the U.S. and the world, Wal-Mart currently operates
in 10 countries.
Wal-Mart operated Discount Stores as well as “Supercenters” which include grocery
departments and constitute approximately on et h i r do fa l lc u r r e n tW a l - M a r ts t o r e s .T h e
typical Wal-Mart store spans 100,000-150,000 square feet and employs 150-350 people,
many of them in part-time jobs. (Supercenters employ 400-500 workers each.) By 1998,
one quarter of the 1614 counties entered by Wal-Mart had more than one store.
Wal-Mart is extremely eﬃcient even compared with other “big-box” retailers. Lehman
Brothers analysts have noted Wal-Mart’s “leading logistics and information competen-
cies” (Feiner 2001). The Financial Times has called Wal-Mart “an operation whose ef-
ﬁciency is the envy of the world’s storekeepers” (Edgecliﬀe-Johnson 1999). Wal-Mart’s
competitive edge is driven by a combination of conventional cost-cutting and sensitivity
to demand conditions and by superior logistics and distribution systems. The chain’s
most-cited advantages over small retailers are economies of scale and access to capital
4markets, whereas against other large retail chains the most commonly cited factor is
superior logistics, distribution, and inventory control.5
Wal-Mart’s cost-savings extend to its employment practices; it has been accused of
requiring employees to work oﬀ the clock and using illegal-immigrant labor (through
contractors) (see, e.g., Greenhouse 2002, Buckley and Daniel 2003). Such practices, if
true, could reduce Wal-Mart’s measured employment without reducing its actual labor
inputs. Wal-Mart’s low wages are also said to contribute to its measured productivity.
While Wal-Mart wage data are not publicly available, several sources estimate the cur-
rent typical hourly wage of a Wal-Mart “associate” to be $7-$8/hour (Hopkins 2003).
These wages are on par with wages paid by other large discount chains (like K-Mart
and Target), but are typically below union rates.6
3D a t a
3.1 Wal-Mart Stores
I use data on the locations and opening dates of 2,382 Wal-Mart stores in the United
States, collected primarily from Wal-Mart annual reports, Wal-Mart editions of Rand
McNally Road Atlases and annual editions of the Directory of Discount Department
Stores. The available data include store location (by town) and store number.
The following data sources provide one measure of opening dates: Vance and Scott
(1994) list store entries to 1969, the year the company became publicly traded. Annual
reports between 1970 and 1978 include lists of current stores; after 1978 annual reports
list only the number of stores per state. The annual Directory of Discount Department
Stores provides store lists between 1979 and 1993. For recent years I use a special edition
5of the popular Rand McNally road atlas which contains a list of Wal-Mart store loca-
tions, and includes each store’s company-assigned number. The variable WMopenjt
gives the number of new stores to open in county j in year t based on these directories
and store lists.
I also construct an alternate (counter-factual) set of Wal-Mart entry identiﬁers us-
ing a combination of company-assigned store numbers (from the Rand McNally atlases)
and the net change in the number of stores each year (from company annual reports).
Wal-Mart assigns store numbers roughly in sequential order, with store #1 opening
ﬁrst, followed by store #2, and so on. Following this practice, I assign entry dates to
stores sequentially, based on their store numbers. This assignment method provides a
very good approximation to the likely order in which the stores were planned. Aggre-
gating these store-level entry dates to the county-year level, I construct WMplanjt.
WMplanjt gives the number of stores that would have opened in county j in year t
had the stores opened in the order in which they were planned.
More details on variable construction are in Appendix A.1 .
3.2 Employment Data
The unit of observation is a county-year. Of the 3111 counties in the contiguous 48
states, I limit the data set to the 1749 counties with total employment in 1964 above
1500, positive employment growth between 1964 and 1977, and no Wal-Mart entry prior
to 1977. The counties included in the analysis are shown in Figure 2. Annual county-
level employment data by 2-digit SIC (3-digit NAICS) for 1977-1999 come from the
Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) serial. The panel contains 40,227
observations (1749 counties over 23 years).7 Unfortunately, CBP does not contain wage
6data.




Because the data do not appear to contain unit roots, the analysis is done using em-
ployment levels. (See Appendix A.3 for details on unit root tests. Results using ﬁrst

















where retailjt is retail employment; popjt is population size; yeart is a year dummy;
urbanjk ∈ {urban, suburban, rural} is a set of three urbanization dummies allowing for
diﬀerent year ﬁxed eﬀects for urban, suburban, and rural counties;8 countyj is a county
dummy; WalMartjt is the number of new Wal-Mart stores in the county; and θ(L) is
a lag polynomial with six lags and ﬁve leads (the sixth lag represents the cumulative
period six or more years after year t; the reference period is six or more years before
7year t):
θ(L)=θ1F5 + θ2F4 + θ3F3 + θ4F2 + θ5F + θ6




where L is the lag operator and F is the lead operator. The error term ujt is clustered
at the county level to allow for arbitrary autocorrelation.
Both employment and the Wal-Mart variable are divided by the current county
population, so the coeﬃcients θ(L) can be interpreted as the eﬀect of one additional
Wal-Mart store on the level of retail employment.9 Plots of the coeﬃcients θ(L) show
the evolution of employment over a 10-year period, starting ﬁve years before and ending
ﬁve years after Wal-Mart entry into a county. The coeﬃcient θ12, intended to capture
the permanent eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on employment six or more years after entry, is
omitted from the graphs because it is identiﬁed using relatively few observations.
The OLS estimates are valid if Wal-Mart entry is correctly measured and exogenous
to employment changes. Unfortunately, WMopenjt is measured with error, and may
be endogenous to retail employment outcomes. An instrumental-variables speciﬁcation
is used to correct these problems.
4.2 Measurement Error
Measurement error in the Wal-Mart entry variable WMopenjt takes a particular form:
while the entered counties are correctly identiﬁed, the timing of entry may be incorrectly
measured due to errors in the directories. (A particular egregious example of such errors
is the lack of updating of the Directory of Discount Department Stores between 1990
8and 1993, but there are other errors as well.) The counter-factual variable WMplanjt
is also measured with error, by construction: it represents the number of stores that
would have opened had stores always opened in the order in which they were planned.
An instrumental-variables (IV) approach, in which leads and lags of WMplanjt
is used to instrument for leads and lags of WMopenjt, can be used to correct for
this measurement error if the measurement errors in the two variables is classical and
uncorrelated. That the measurement error across the two variables is uncorrelated
seems plausible.10 But because WMopenjt and WMplanjt are both discrete, their
measurement error is not classical: the actual number of Wal-Mart stores in city j in
year t diﬀers from the measured number by an integer whose expected mean is diﬀerent
from zero. This induces a slight bias in the instrumental-variables results reported
here.11
4.3 Endogeneity
Another diﬃculty in assessing the impact of Wal-Mart entry on the level and composi-
tion of county employment is the possible endogeneity of Wal-Mart’s entry decision with
respect to retail employment. There are two dimensions to this potential endogeneity:
Wal-Mart may select the counties it enters non-randomly, and it may choose the timing
of entry non-randomly.
If Wal-Mart selects counties whose growth rates exceed those of non-entered counties,
a spurious positive eﬀect will be registered by the estimated coeﬃcientsb θ(L). To address
this concern, I limit the analysis to counties that constitute a good control group for
entered counties: counties with a 1964 population above 1500 and a positive average
growth rate of total employment between 1964 and 1977. I also remove counties entered
9by Wal-Mart before 1977 to eliminate concerns about the endogeneity of employment
growth. Wal-Mart entered 75% of the remaining 1749 counties between 1977 and 1998,
compared with only 13% of the excluded counties.12
To address endogeneity of the timing of entry (conditional on the counties selected for
entry), I rely again on store planning dates described above. This identiﬁcation strategy
assumes that Wal-Mart plans its store entries well in advance of entry and cannot
accurately forecast exact market conditions at the time for which entry is planned.
Because the company may ﬁne-tune entry dates based on current market conditions,
the actual entry date may be endogenous, but can be instrumented for using the date
for which entry was planned. For the purposes of exposition, suppose Wal-Mart has a
once-and-for-all eﬀect on retail employment (so we can estimate a simple diﬀerences-in-







jt is retail employment county j in year t i nt h ep r e s e n c eo faW a l - M a r t
store, and retail0
jt is retail employment in the absence of the Wal-Mart store. Since we
cannot observe both retailWM
jt and retail0


















That is, the presence of a Wal-Mart store in county j in year t is uncorrelated with
10the error term in the retail employment equation: controlling for some basic county
characteristics (in this case, simply county ﬁxed eﬀects), Wal-Mart entry is exogenous.
This assumption is a very strong one, and unlikely to be true.
The instrumental-variables strategy described above corrects for this endogeneity
concern under two identifying assumptions: the number of planned Wal-Mart stores
(per capita) for county j and year t are independent of the error term in Equation (2);
and planned Wal-Mart stores aﬀect retail employment per capita only insofar as they






As this discussion suggests, the IV estimator b θ will be biased if plans to build a Wal-
Mart store spur the building of a strip mall — or the closing of an existing store — in
anticipate of Wal-Mart’s entry, even if Wal-Mart does not actually open a store in that
county the year it planned to.13 The estimator will also be biased if Wal-Mart’s planners
can foresee employment ﬂuctuations at the time of the store’s planning, or if planning
dates anticipate that a growth spurt will occur over the next few years and the (actual)
timing of entry is then adjusted to coincide (on average) with such a spurt.
Because the regression equation is exactly identiﬁed (12 leads and lags of WMplanjt
instrument for 12 leads and lags of WMopenjt), these identifying assumptions cannot
be tested directly. I employ an indirect test instead, using the lead coeﬃcients θ1 −θ5:
if Wal-Mart times entry to take advantage of retail growth spurts then (under most
conditions) we should see some increase in retail employment in lead coeﬃcients θ1−θ5.
This increase would be apparent in OLS estimates, but will be absent in IV estimates
if the instrumental-variables strategy corrects for this endogeneity.14
11I also estimate the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on manufacturing employment, using it
as a falsiﬁcation test: if Wal-Mart planned entry to coincide with general employment
increases, manufacturing employment would increase with Wal-Mart entry. As the
results below show, this is not the case. I conclude that the IV strategy appears to
correct for endogeneity as well as measurement error.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Retail Employment
To begin, I present OLS results using WMopenjt entry dates in Figure 3.15 Retail
e m p l o y m e n ti ss h o w nt oi n c r e a s eb ya b o u t4 0j o b si nt h ey e a ro fe n t r y ,u pt oh a l fo fw h i c h
are eliminated within ﬁve years. In addition, 20 jobs are estimated to have been created
in the year before Wal-Mart entry. While this increase is small in absolute magnitude, it
is statistically signiﬁcant and disconcertingly large relative to the estimated post-entry
eﬀect.16
The IV results are shown in Figure 4. The eﬀe c to fe n t r yi se s t i m a t e dm u c hm o r e
cleanly at approximately 100 jobs. In the years immediately following entry, there is
a loss of 40-60 jobs. The net eﬀect at the ﬁve-year horizon, however, is positive and
signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0003).
Recall that the typical Wal-Mart store employs 150-350 workers. These results sug-
gest that employment increases by less than the full amount of Wal-Mart’s hiring, even
before allowing other ﬁrms time to fully adjust to Wal-Mart’s entry. Part of this discrep-
ancy can be explained by buyouts of existing chain stores by Wal-Mart Corporation,
and prompt exit and cutbacks by other retailers. Another (albeit unlikely) possibility
12is that Wal-Mart replaces existing part-time jobs with full-time jobs. CBP employ-
ment ﬁgures do not control for hours worked, so full-time and part-time employees are
weighted equally.
Very little is known about employment conditions at Wal-Mart, including the preva-
lence of part-time work. A reasonable prior is that Wal-Mart employees work fewer
hours than other retail workers (Using French data, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) ﬁnd
that entry of large retailers is increases part-time employment relative to all retail em-
ployment). Wal-Mart claims that 70% of its employees work 28 hours a week or more
(Wal-Mart 2001a). This ﬁgure is within the norm for workers in the discount retail
industry (Peled 2001), and also in keeping with the rest of the retail industry: the
30th percentile of hours worked by retail employees, computed from the March Current
Population Survey (CPS) for 1978-1999, is 28 hours across employer size, state, and
year.
As noted in Section 4.3, if the timing of entry were endogenous, we would expect
to see an increase in the county’s retail employment prior to entry. No such eﬀect
is evident in the leading coeﬃcients, although, footnote 14 makes clear, this is not
conclusive evidence in support of the identifying assumption.
5.2 Retail Establishments
To capture the eﬀect of Wal-Mart on the number of retail establishments, I estimate




popjt ,w h e r e
estabjt is the number of retail establishments in county j at year t in each of three size
categories.
To conﬁrm that Wal-Mart’s creation can be detected in the data, I estimate the
13regressions using the number of large retail establishments (100 or more employees).
IV results are shown in Figure 5; estimated coeﬃcients mirror those on retail employ-
m e n ts h o w ni nF i g u r e4 . T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h en umber of large retail establishments,
approximately 0.7, suggests that Wal-Mart’s entry often coincides with exit or con-
traction of other large retailers. In some cases, Wal-Mart acquired a large number of
stores from a competitor; in other cases, incumbent establishments may have chosen to
exit preemptively.17 There is a small decline in the number of large establishments in
subsequent years.
Figure 6 shows the eﬀect of Wal-Mart on the number of small establishments (fewer
than 20 employees). It shows a decline of 4 retail establishments within 5 years of
Wal-Mart entry, 3 of them within two years of entry. The number of medium-sized
establishments (20-99 employees), shown in Figure 7, decreases by about 0.7 in the
second year following entry, then remains ﬂat.
5.3 Other Sectors
Wal-Mart competes with establishments in a wide array of sectors, some more directly
than others. Wal-Mart Supercenters compete directly with grocery stores, while Dis-
count Stores do not; all Wal-Mart stores compete with apparel stores, hardware stores,
bookstores, music stores, etc. Moreover, since Wal-Mart is vertically integrated, it com-
petes against wholesalers as well as retailers. In this section, I look for an eﬀect of
Wal-Mart on wholesale employment, which could be due to Wal-Mart’s indirect com-
petition with wholesalers. I also look for an eﬀect of Wal-Mart on two retail segments
— restaurants and automobile dealerships and service stations — where Wal-Mart does
not compete. Finally, as a falsiﬁcation exercise, I estimate Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on manu-
14facturing employment.
The estimated eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on county-level wholesale employment is
s h o w ni nF i g u r e8 .T h eo b s e r v e dd e c l i n eo fa pproximately 20 wholesale jobs following
Wal-Mart entry is marginally signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0682).
I use employment in restaurants and in automobile sales and service to test for
an agglomeration eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry. If these sectors expand due to Wal-Mart
entry, one interpretation could be that Wal-Mart creates positive externalities for other
retailers in the area. I ﬁnd no evidence that Wal-Mart entry aﬀects either of these
two sectors. The evolution of employment by restaurants is shown in Figure 9. While
restaurant employment per capita grows throughout the period surrounding Wal-Mart
entry, there is no discontinuity in that trend associated with entry of Wal-Mart. Figure
10 shows employment in automobile sales and service. Here there is no trend whatsoever:
Wal-Mart entry is not associated with any changes in employment in this sector. These
results suggest that agglomeration economies generated by Wal-Mart (if any) must be
at a level of aggregation substantially smaller than the county.
Manufacturing employment is shown in Figure 11. The conﬁdence intervals are
very large and there are some large ﬂuctuations over the 10-year period shown, but no
substantial increase or break in manufacturing employment can be seen before or at the
time of Wal-Mart entry. It appears unlikely that Wal-Mart plans its new stores based
on prior knowledge about future growth in the manufacturing sector. Since the typical
Wal-Mart store has 150-350 employees — less than 2% of total employment in the average
county at the time of the Wal-Mart entry — it is unlikely to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
total county employment, and indeed, the estimated eﬀect on total employment (not
shown) is statistically zero.18
155.4 Neighboring Counties
If Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on the retail industry in the entered county is due to agglomeration
economies, entry could produce negative eﬀects on neighboring counties’ employment
( i nb o t ht h er e t a i la n dw h o l e s a l es e c t o r s ) . Unfortunately, estimating Wal-Mart’s eﬀect
on neighboring counties with any precision is impossible, as the conﬁdence intervals
around the point estimates are very large.
Id e ﬁne counties as “neighbors” if the distance between their geographic centers is
within some ﬁxed range (e.g., 5, 10, or 25 miles). To estimate the eﬀect of Wal-Mart
entry in county j on retail employment in the surrounding area, I use the same strat-
egy as with own-county eﬀects but replace retail employment per capita in the entered
county with retail employment per capita in neighboring counties. I include controls
for the number of Wal-Mart stores in neighboring counties to avoid estimating a spu-
rious relationship between Wal-Mart entry in county j a n de m p l o y m e n ti nn e i g h b o r i n g
counties (since Wal-Mart entry dates are correlated in neighboring counties).
In the estimated results, not shown, conﬁdence intervals are too large to reject
any eﬀect of Wal-Mart, positive or negative, on the distributive trade in neighboring
counties.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Wal-Mart entry has raised concerns in many communities about the changes it may
cause to the size and structure of the retail industry. Wal-Mart’s reputed eﬃciency,
combined with its market power, could cause a decline in the number of retail jobs in
the community. In this paper, I do not take a position on whether such a decline is
16favorable or harmful, but merely attempt to quantify the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on
retail employment and on the number of retail establishments. Using an instrumental-
variables approach to correct for endogeneity of Wal-Mart entry, and measurement error
in the data, I conclude that Wal-Mart entry has a small positive eﬀect on retail employ-
ment at the county level while reducing the number of small retail establishments in the
county. I also ﬁnd a small negative eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on wholesale employment.
No eﬀect can be seen on retail sectors in which Wal-Mart does not compete directly:
restaurants and automobile sales and service. The latter fact suggests that Wal-Mart
does not create large agglomeration externalities at the county level. Wal-Mart’s eﬀect
on neighboring counties cannot be precisely estimated, so I cannot determine whether
Wal-Mart entry reduces retail employment in neighboring counties.
The experiment is a clean one, because I am able to identify the date of entry
precisely, using an instrumental-variables speciﬁcation. The eﬀect I estimate is a ﬂexible
reduced-form eﬀect, allowing both Wal-Mart and other ﬁrms in the county of entry to
adjust to the shock over a period of several years. Finally, because I use a large panel
of approximately 1750 counties over 23 years, and because Wal-Mart entry is a “large”
shock relative to the size of the local retail market in most counties — median county retail
employment in 1990 was only 1500, while the average Wal-Mart store had approximately
3 0 0e m p l o y e e s—t h ee ﬀect can be estimated with relative precision. Of course, these
eﬀects represent the average impact of Wal-Mart and may not be representative of any
individual county’s experience.
The small magnitude of the estimated eﬀe c to fW a l - M a r to nr e t a i le m p l o y m e n ti s
striking in light of the level of public discussion on this topic. Other eﬀects Wal-Mart
entry — for example, on prices, tax revenue, or the environment — have not been ruled out
17by this analysis; nor has the possibility that the small net county-level eﬀects described
here mask much larger reallocations at the sub-county level. Publicly available data
cannot address that concern, so it remains an open question.
A Data and Empirical Issues
A.1 Wal-Mart Data
Table 2 shows the sources from which store opening dates, used in the construction
of the variable WMopenjt, were drawn. Chain Store Guides’ Directories of Discount
Department Stores from 1990-1993 are available, but are largely uninformative; the
directories appear not to have been updated in those years.
For stores that do not appear in the 1989 directory, but do appear in the 1995 Rand
McNally road atlas (i.e., exist in 1994), opening dates are assigned according to the
following algorithm. From the annual reports, I obtain the net increase in the number
of Wal-Mart stores in each state each year. Since there are very few store closures, I
use the net increase to proxy for the number of new stores to open each year in each
state. For example, in Arizona, 5 new stores opened in 1990, 7 in 1991, and one each
in 1992 and 1993. Using the list of stores that existed in 1994 but not in 1989, I assign
entry dates randomly, in proportion to their probability of opening in each year. Each
store that opened in Arizona during this period is assigned the opening date 1990 with
probability 5
14; 1991 with probability 1
2; and 1992 and 1993 with probability 1
14 each.
In all, 680 stores’ opening dates are assigned in this way: 203 in 1990, 145 in 1991, 181
in 1992, and 151 in 1993.19
The accuracy of this method depends critically on Wal-Mart not reassigning numbers
18in the event of store closure. Only 40 stores closed over the entire period 1964-1999, so
the latter condition appears to be satisﬁed; this also implies that reassignment of store
numbers cannot be common.
A.2 Employment Data
In counties with a small number of employers, data on the total number of employees
in a sector may be omitted from County Business Patterns to avoid disclosure of the
number of employees in individual ﬁrms; a range (1-19, 20-99, etc.) is then given instead
of an exact number of employees. In those instances, I assume that the actual number
of workers is a weighted mean of the lower and upper bounds on the given employment
range (with weight 2
3 on the lower bound and 1
3 on the upper bound). For example, a
ﬁrm with 1-19 employees is assigned a value of 7.20
A.3 Unit Roots
To test whether county-level employment per capita contain unit roots, I run a Dickey-
Fuller (DF) test on each county series separately, after removing year ﬁxed eﬀects in-
teracted with 1960 urbanization status (urban, suburban, rural). By construction, a
5% rejection rate is to be expected at the 95% conﬁdence level if the series have unit
roots. Because DF tests sometimes fail to reject unit roots even when none are present,
I also use the Maddala and Wu (1999) and Levin and Lin (1993) more powerful panel
unit root tests. Validity of panel unit root tests depend on the series being independent
realizations of a single common process.
Table 3 reports the test results. The ﬁrst column shows the fraction of counties
for which county-by-county Dickey-Fuller tests rejected the presence of unit roots at
1995% signiﬁcance. The rejection rates of 6%-14% for these series are higher than the
expected 5% under the null hypothesis of unit roots. The second and third columns
report p-values from Maddala-Wu and Levin-Lin tests, respectively. A common unit
root process is rejected by both tests for each series.
20Notes
1Exceptions include Stone’s (1997 and elsewhere) Iowa case studies and other local studies modeled
on his approach. These studies do not employ any exogenous variation to predict Wal-Mart entry so
their results are diﬃcult to interpret. Findings range from signﬁcant job loss to mild job creation.
2Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) cleverly avoid this problem, using variation in permits given to
large retailers due to exogenous variation in the composition of zoning boards, to analyze the eﬀect of
entry on French labor markets. They ﬁnd that regulation limiting entry of large retailers has slowed
employment growth in the French retail industry.
3Wal-Mart’s lower prices — diﬀused throughout the local market — may partially oﬀset this eﬀect by
increasing demand for retail services (Basker 2004).
4These sectors are the only two retail 2-digit SIC sectors in which it can be argued Wal-Mart is not
a direct competitor. Some Wal-Mart stores do include fast-food restaurants and/or gas stations, but
the prevalence of these departments during the sample period is very small.
5Details on Wal-Mart’s operations can be found in Harvard Business School’s three case studies
about Wal-Mart (Ghemawat 1989, Foley and Mahmood 1996, and Ghemawat and Friedman 1999).
6In markets where Wal-Mart competes directly with unionized retailers, it is said to match the union
wage (Saporito 2003).
7The relevant SIC (NAICS) codes are as follows. Retail: SIC 52-59 except 55 and 58, NAICS 44
except 441 and 447; Wholesale: SIC 50-51, NAICS 42; Restaurants: SIC 58, NAICS 721; Automobile:
SIC 55, NAICS 441 and 447; Manufacturing: SIC 20-39, NAICS 31.
8Ac o u n t yi sd e ﬁned as urban if it was inside an MSA (metropolitan statistical area) in 1960;
suburban if it was ≤25 miles from the nearest MSA in 1960; and rural otherwise.
9The use of per-capita terms on both the left- and right-hand sides of Equation (1) could cause a
spurious correlation between the variables that would bias the estimated coeﬃcients. In practice, the
year-to-year variation in county population is small enough that it is not driving the results; the results
are robust to normalization by a constant such as the 1990 county population. See also footnote 18.
2110This assumption would be violated if some stores, for example in metropolitan areas, experience
shorter planning phases and were also more likely to appear in the directories sooner, due to better
directory coverage. This does not appear to be the case.
11Since store closings are exceedingly rare, when the directories report zero new Wal-Marts in town,
the expected number of openings is some (small) positive number. Similarly, when the reported number
of new Wal-Marts is one, the expected number is less than one. Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) suggest
a GMM estimator to address this problem. Unfortunately, due to the size of the panel and the hundreds
of covariates, their solution is not computationally feasible in this setting.
12Indistinguishable results are obtained if the sample is limited instead to entered counties.
13Anecdotal evidence suggests that small retailers tend to continue operating as long as they can,
even when this is not proﬁt maximizing (Peled 2001).
14 The test is imperfect. To see this, suppose Wal-Mart forecasters can predict which counties will
experience growth spurts in retail employment over the next few years, and plan to open stores in
those counties. Under this scenario, Wal-Mart’s planned entry dates would coincide imperfectly with
growth spurts, but actual opening dates could be adjusted (for example, by delaying construction) to
fall precisely during these spurts. If employment growth of the sort Wal-Mart uses to ﬁne-tune its entry
arrives in isolated spurts (i.e., Wal-Mart does not enter counties experiencing sustained growth in retail
employment that lasts for several years), there would be no pre-entry growth in the IV estimates even
if Wal-Mart entry is not causally associated with any increase in employment.
15Throughout the paper, the 95% conﬁdence intervals shown use asymptotic standard errors clustered
at the county level. The reference period is 6 or more years prior to Wal-Mart entry.
16Rduced-form estimates using WMplanjt are extremely similar.
17Examples of establishment acquisition include Wal-Mart’s 1977 purchase of 16 Mohr Value Discount
Department Stores in Missouri and Illinois, and its 1981 purchase of 106 stores in nine states from
Kuhn’s-Big K Stores Corp.
18 Ih a v ea l s ot e s t e df o ra ne ﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on county population, using annual Census
Bureau estimates of county population for the years 1977-1999. I ﬁnd no eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on
22population.
19Entry dates assigned in this way are measured with error, but they are unbiased.










, because counties small enough to elicit concerns about disclosure of information on individual
ﬁrms in aggregate data seem likely to have a disproportionate number of small employers. The results
are robust to this speciﬁcation.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median
Population 120,500 42,000
Retail Employment 5,000 1,300
Automotive Retail Employment 1,000 350
Restaurant Employment 3,000 800
Wholesale Employment 3,000 550
Manufacturing Employment 7,500 2,300
Number of Small Retail Establishmentsa 360 130
Number of Medium Retail Establishmentsa 35 11
Number of Large Retail Establishmentsa 81
a Small establishments: 1-19 employees; medium: 20-99; large: 100+
Table 2: Directory Sources for Wal-Mart Opening Dates
Years Source
1962-1969 Vance and Scott [1994]
1970-1978 Wal-Mart Annual Reports
1979-1982 Directory of Discount Department Stores
1983-1986 Directory of Discount Stores
1987-1989 Directory of Discount Department Stores
1990-1993 See text
1994-1997 Rand McNally Road Atlas
T a b l e3 :U n i tR o o tT e s t s
Dickey-Fuller Maddala-Wu Levin-Lin
Employment % Rejected p-Value p-Value
Retail 9.43 0.0000 0.0000
Wholesale 13.72 0.0000 0.0000
Restaurant 13.72 0.0000 0.0000
Automotive 12.12 0.0000 0.0000




Figure 1: Location of Wal-Mart Stores, Various Years
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Figure 11: Evolution of Manufacturing Employment (IV)
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